For most A‑Level questions the focus is on M0/M1, the “narrow” money supply that the central bank can control directly.
The core identity is:
MV = PY
Key assumptions (syllabus wording):
When these assumptions hold, a change in the money supply directly changes the price level (inflation) in proportion to the change in M.
These three motives together explain why money demand can be both income‑elastic (a) and interest‑elastic (b).
Commercial banks keep only a fraction of deposits as reserves and lend out the rest. The central bank sets the reserve‑requirement ratio (RR).
Money‑multiplier (potential maximum):
M = (1 / RR) × R
where R = total reserves held by the banking system.
Example: RR = 10 % (0.10) and reserves = £100 million → maximum money supply = £1 billion.
Limits to the multiplier (syllabus points):
Two broad categories are examined in the syllabus:
| Tool | How It Works (Transmission) | Typical Use in Reducing Inflation |
|---|---|---|
| Open‑market operations (selling government securities) | Reduces banks’ reserves → inter‑bank rate rises → market rates increase → borrowing falls. | Quick, precise control of the monetary base. |
| Policy interest rates (base, repo, discount) | Higher policy rate → higher commercial‑bank rates → higher cost of credit for households and firms. | Clear signal; anchors inflation expectations. |
| Reserve‑requirement ratio | Higher RR reduces the amount banks can lend for each unit of deposit. | Strong control over credit creation; used as a backup tool. |
| Standing facilities (discount window, marginal lending rate) | Higher lending rate to banks raises the floor for market rates. | Reinforces the policy‑rate stance. |
| Exchange‑rate intervention (in an open economy) | Purchase of foreign currency → domestic currency appreciates → import prices fall → lower import‑price inflation. | Effective when import‑price pressures dominate. |
| Credit controls (e.g., loan‑to‑value limits, sectoral caps) | Directly restricts the volume of new lending, especially in overheating sectors. | Targets sector‑specific price pressures (housing, commodities). |
| Tool | Effect on AD | Typical Inflation‑Reducing Use |
|---|---|---|
| Higher direct taxes (e.g., income tax, corporation tax) | Reduces disposable income → left‑ward shift of AD. | Targeted at high‑income or profit‑making sectors. |
| Higher indirect taxes (e.g., VAT, excise duties) | Raises the price of consumption goods → reduces real consumption → left‑ward AD shift. | Broad‑based, quick to implement. |
| Reduced government spending | Directly lowers aggregate demand. | Often combined with tax rises for a balanced fiscal stance. |
| Automatic stabilisers (e.g., higher unemployment benefits during a downturn) | Mitigate the size of AD fluctuations; in a high‑inflation context they can be *tightened* (e.g., by reducing benefit levels) to aid disinflation. | Less discretionary; impact depends on the business cycle. |
In the AD–AS framework these measures shift the long‑run aggregate‑supply curve (LRAS) rightward, easing price‑level pressures without sacrificing output.
| Policy | Mechanism | Advantages | Disadvantages / Limits | Typical Effectiveness (Short‑ vs Long‑run) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Open‑market sales | Withdraws reserves → higher inter‑bank rates. | Fast, precise control of the monetary base. | May be offset if banks hoard excess reserves; transmission lag. | High in the short‑run; limited if liquidity trap. |
| Policy interest rate increase | Raises cost of borrowing across the economy. | Transparent, signals commitment, influences expectations. | Zero‑lower‑bound problem; effectiveness falls when credit demand is interest‑inelastic. | Very effective when the interest‑rate channel is strong. |
| Reserve‑requirement rise | Directly caps banks’ lending capacity. | Strong lever on credit creation. | Coarse tool; can destabilise banking sector; rarely changed. | Moderate – usually a backup to rate policy. |
| Exchange‑rate intervention (appreciation) | Makes imports cheaper → lowers import‑price inflation. | Immediate impact on import prices. | Reduces export competitiveness; depends on capital mobility. | Effective in small open economies with flexible rates. |
| Credit controls (LTV, sector caps) | Limits new lending in overheating sectors. | Targets specific price pressures (e.g., housing). | Can be circumvented; may slow growth in the targeted sector. | High for sector‑specific inflation; low for economy‑wide inflation. |
| Higher direct taxes | Reduces disposable income → lower consumption. | Can be targeted (luxury goods, carbon taxes). | Politically unpopular; may discourage labour supply. | Moderate – depends on tax‑elasticity of demand. |
| Reduced government spending | Direct cut to AD. | Clear fiscal signal; improves public‑finance balance. | Risk of recession; long implementation lag. | Low‑to‑moderate – limited by the fiscal multiplier. |
| Supply‑side reforms | Shift LRAS right → higher potential output, lower structural inflation. | Long‑run growth benefits; reduces cost‑push pressures. | Long implementation lag; political resistance. | High in the long run, low in the short run. |
When answering an evaluation question, candidates should consider the following criteria (as set out by the syllabus):
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