Governments intervene for a variety of reasons – protecting infant industries, preserving strategic sectors, correcting market failures, or achieving macro‑economic objectives.
| Instrument | How it works | Typical macro‑objective | WTO / compliance note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tariff (specific or ad‑valorem) | Tax on each unit (or value) of an imported good. | Reduce imports → improve current‑account; protect domestic producers. | Generally allowed, but must not exceed bound rates. |
| Import quota | Quantitative limit on the volume of a specific import. | Directly caps imports → larger CA improvement. | Considered a quantitative restriction – requires WTO justification (e.g., balance‑of‑payments). |
| Export subsidy | Payment to domestic producers for each unit exported. | Boost export volume and employment in target sectors. | Prohibited under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. |
| Export tax / duty | Levy on each unit of a good leaving the country. | Conserve scarce resources; raise fiscal revenue. | Generally permissible, but must be non‑discriminatory. |
| Import licensing | Administrative permission required before an import can occur; may be quantitative or qualitative. | Control volume or ensure standards (e.g., health, safety). | Allowed if applied uniformly and not a disguised restriction. |
| Embargo | Complete ban on trade (imports, exports, or both) with a specific country or product. | Political or security objectives; sometimes used to protect domestic industry. | May be challenged under the WTO if not justified on security grounds. |
| Non‑tariff barriers (NTBs) – “red‑tape” | Technical standards, sanitary‑phytosanitary (SPS) rules, licensing, etc., that restrict trade without a tax. | Protect health, environment, consumer safety; sometimes used to protect domestic producers. | Must be based on scientific evidence and be no more trade‑restrictive than necessary (WTO SPS Agreement). |
When a persistent deficit (or surplus) threatens macro‑stability, policymakers may combine the following tools. The choice depends on the underlying cause (e.g., low export competitiveness vs. excessive import demand).
| Policy tool | Mechanism | Typical effect on CA | Key considerations |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exchange‑rate devaluation (or depreciation) | Exports become cheaper; imports become more expensive. | Improves goods balance if export and import demand are price‑elastic. | May trigger import‑price inflation; effectiveness depends on elasticity and pass‑through. |
| Export taxes / duties | Reduces outflow of scarce resources; generates fiscal revenue. | Directly improves the primary‑income balance; may lower export earnings. | Useful for natural‑resource management; can be regressive if revenue is not redistributed. |
| Import licensing / quantitative restrictions | Limits volume of specific imports. | Improves goods balance; effect size depends on compliance and possible rent‑seeking. | Administrative costs; may provoke WTO disputes. |
| Tariff adjustments (increase or reduction) | Higher tariffs reduce imports; lower tariffs stimulate export‑oriented sectors. | Higher tariffs → CA improvement; lower tariffs → possible CA deterioration but may boost growth. | Need to balance short‑term CA gains against long‑term welfare loss. |
| Fiscal & monetary policy coordination | Contractionary fiscal stance or tighter monetary policy lowers domestic demand for imports. | Reduces import bill → CA improves. | Risk of slowing growth and raising unemployment. |
| Structural reforms (productivity, infrastructure, education) | Raise export competitiveness and diversify the export base. | Long‑run CA improvement through higher export earnings. | Time‑lagged; requires political commitment. |
| Criterion | What to assess |
|---|---|
| Direct impact on the targeted macro‑objective | Effect on growth, unemployment, inflation, CA balance, exchange‑rate stability. |
| Spill‑over effects on other objectives | e.g., a tariff may improve the CA but raise consumer prices (inflation) and reduce equity. |
| Time‑lag | Immediate (tariffs, quotas) vs. medium‑/long‑term (structural reforms, skill‑training). |
| Feasibility & WTO compliance | Whether the measure breaches WTO rules (e.g., export subsidies, quantitative restrictions). |
| Distributional consequences | Who gains (producers, workers) and who loses (consumers, import‑dependent sectors). |
| Administrative & enforcement costs | Complexity of licences, monitoring of quotas, customs administration, risk of corruption. |
| Dynamic effects | Impact on investment, innovation, resource allocation over time. |
| Instrument | Growth | Unemployment | Inflation | Balance of Payments | Equity | Sustainability | Key trade‑offs / notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tariffs | Low‑Medium – protect domestic firms but reduce allocative efficiency. | Medium – preserve jobs in protected sectors. | Medium – higher import prices raise CPI. | Medium – lower import volume improves CA. | Low – consumers pay higher prices. | Low – may encourage resource‑intensive production. | Risk of WTO disputes and retaliation; effectiveness depends on price elasticity. |
| Import quotas | Low‑Medium | Medium | Medium | Medium‑High – directly caps imports. | Low – quota rents often captured by importers. | Low – may lead to over‑use of domestic inputs. | Creates rent‑seeking; can generate black‑market activity. |
| Export subsidies | Medium‑High – boost export‑led growth. | Medium‑High – protect export‑oriented jobs. | Low‑Medium – higher aggregate demand may push up prices. | Low‑Medium – larger export volume can worsen CA if retaliation follows. | Low – benefits narrow industries. | Low – may ignore environmental costs. | Prohibited under WTO rules; can provoke trade wars. |
| Export taxes | Low – reduce export revenue. | Low – cut jobs in export sectors. | Low‑Medium – reduce aggregate demand. | High – reduce outflows, improving CA. | Medium – revenue can be redistributed. | Medium – discourages over‑exploitation of scarce resources. | Useful for natural‑resource preservation. |
| Import licensing | Low‑Medium | Low‑Medium | Medium – administrative delays raise costs. | Medium‑High – restricts import volumes. | Low – creates barriers for consumers. | Medium – can block harmful imports (e.g., hazardous chemicals). | Often justified on health, safety or environmental grounds. |
| Embargoes | Low – severe market distortion. | Low‑Medium – depends on sector exposure. | Variable – price shocks possible. | High – drastic reduction in targeted trade flows. | Low – consumer welfare falls sharply. | Variable – can be used for environmental or human‑rights reasons. | Highly contentious; may breach WTO obligations. |
| Exchange‑rate devaluation | Medium‑High – cheaper exports, pricier imports. | Medium‑High – export‑linked employment rises. | Medium‑High – import‑price inflation. | Medium‑High – improves CA if price elasticities are high. | Low – import‑dependent households face higher costs. | Medium – expansion may raise carbon output. | Effectiveness hinges on elasticity; may trigger inflationary spiral. |
| Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) | High – larger markets, economies of scale. | Medium‑High – sectoral job creation, but adjustment costs. | Low‑Medium – import competition can lower prices. | Low‑Medium – trade volume rises; CA impact depends on export‑import mix. | Medium – overall welfare gain but winners/losers exist. | Medium‑High – can spread greener technologies; may increase carbon‑intensive trade. | Requires complementary policies (re‑training, safety nets). |
| Regulatory standards (NTBs) | Low‑Medium – may raise production costs. | Low‑Medium – possible job loss in non‑compliant sectors. | Low – generally price‑neutral. | Low‑Medium – act as non‑tariff barriers to imports. | Medium – protects health, safety, consumer rights. | High – environmental standards promote sustainability. | Must be non‑discriminatory to satisfy WTO rules. |
A specific tariff raises the domestic price of the imported good. The immediate effects are:
Assume a small open economy with perfect capital mobility and a floating exchange rate.
The BoP can be represented by two stacked rectangles:
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