An externality occurs when a market transaction imposes costs or confers benefits on third‑parties who are not part of the transaction. This creates a divergence between private and social marginal values and generates a welfare loss.
| Criterion | What to consider |
|---|---|
| Effectiveness | Does the instrument move the market outcome toward the socially optimal quantity (i.e., eliminate the DWL)? |
| Efficiency | Are administrative, monitoring and compliance costs low relative to the welfare gain? Is there any excess burden (e.g., tax‑induced deadweight loss)? |
| Equity | Who bears the cost and who receives the benefit? Are the effects progressive, regressive, or neutral? |
| Practicality & Political Feasibility | Is the instrument easy to enforce? Does it enjoy public or industry support? Are there legal or institutional constraints? |
| Concept | Short‑run (SR) | Long‑run (LR) |
|---|---|---|
| Cost curves | TC = TFC + TVC; AVC = TVC/Q, AFC = TFC/Q, ATC = TC/Q, MC = ΔTC/ΔQ. |
All costs are variable; LR‑ATC is the envelope of SR‑ATC curves. |
| Revenue | TR = P × Q; MR = ΔTR/ΔQ. |
Same formulas; in perfect competition P = MR = AR. |
| Profit | π = TR – TC. Break‑even when TR = TC (π = 0). |
Normal profit occurs when P = LR‑ATC; economic profit = 0. Any deviation triggers entry or exit. |
| Shutdown rule (SR) | Produce if P ≥ AVC; otherwise shut down. | Produce if P ≥ ATC (covers all costs in LR). |
| Structure | Key Characteristics | Price‑Setting Behaviour | Efficiency Implications |
|---|---|---|---|
| Perfect Competition | |||
| Many small firms, homogeneous product, free entry & exit, perfect information. | Price taker: P = MR = MC at output where MC = MR. | Allocative efficiency (P = MC) and productive efficiency (P = min ATC) in the long run. | No DWL; consumer surplus maximised. |
| Monopoly | |||
| Single seller, unique product, high barriers to entry, price maker. | Chooses Q where MR = MC; price set from demand curve (P > MC). | Price‑elasticity of demand determines the markup: $$\frac{P-MC}{P}= -\frac{1}{\varepsilon_d}$$ |
Produces less & charges a higher price than the competitive outcome → DWL. |
| Monopolistic Competition | |||
| Many firms, differentiated products, low barriers, some market power. | SR: MR = MC, P > MC; LR: zero economic profit (P = ATC) but excess capacity. | Price above MC due to product differentiation; some allocative inefficiency. | Trade‑off between variety (consumer preference) and inefficiency. |
| Oligopoly | |||
| Few large firms, interdependent decisions, possible product differentiation, barriers to entry. | Strategic behaviour modelled with game theory (Cournot, Stackelberg, kinked‑demand, price leadership). | Outcome depends on collusion vs. competition; price may be close to MC or far above it. | Potential for both efficiency (if competitive) and significant DWL (if collusive). |
| Natural Monopoly | |||
| Very high fixed costs, low marginal costs; a single firm can supply the whole market at lower average cost. | Regulated pricing:
|
Without regulation, monopoly price > MC → large DWL. | Regulation aims to restore allocative efficiency while preserving the economies of scale that justify a single‑firm provision. |
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